We extend the optimal strategy results of Kelly and Breiman and extend the class of random variables to which they apply from discrete to arbitrary random variables with expectations. Let Fn be the fortune obtained at the nth time period by using any given strategy and let P.; be the fortune obtained by using the Kelly-Breiman strategy. We show ("Theorem l(i
Introduction
Suppose a gambler is given the opportunity to bet a fixed fraction 'Y of his (infinitely divisible) capital on successive flips of a biased coin: on each flip, with probability p >!he wins an amount equal to his bet and with probability q = 1-p he loses his bet. What is a good choice for 'Y and why is it good?
This question is subtle because the obvious answer has an obvious flaw. The obvious answer is for the gambler to choose 'Y = 1 to maximize the expected value of his fortune. The obvious flaw is that he is then broke in n or fewer trials with probability 1-pn, which tends to 1 as n tends to oo.
A germinal answer was given by Kelly [10] : a gambler should choose 'Y = p -q so as to maximize the expected value of the log of his fortune. He shows that a gambler who chooses 'Y = p -q will 'with probability 1 eventually get ahead and stay ahead of one using any other value of -y' ([10] , p. 920).
In an important paper Breiman [ 4] generalizes and considers strategies other F~ at the conclusion of the nth trial. He shows that if Fn is a fortune resulting from the use of any strategy, then lim F.JF: almost surely exists and E(lim F,JF~) ~ 1. In what follows we shall be concerned solely with magnitude results, like this asymptotic magnitude result of Breirnan's, but the reader should be aware that under additional hypotheses Breirnan also shows that T(x), the time required to have a fortune exceeding x, has an expectation which is asymptotically minimized by the above fixed-fraction strategy.
The problem of how to apportion capital between various random variables is exactly the problem of portfolio selection, and so it is correct to suppose that these results on optimal allocation of capital are of considerable interest to economists, as Kelly recognized ( [10] , p. 926). He also prophetically realized that economists, familar with logarithmic utility, could easily misunderstand his result and think, incorrectly, that the choice of maximizing the expected value of the log of the fortune depended upon using logarithmic utility for money. For discussion see [15] , p. 216 and [17] . An interesting concise discussion of the 'capital growth model of Kelly [10] , Breirnan [ 4] , and Latane [11] ' from an economic point of view can be found in [3] . A brief discussion of Kelly's proof will motivate his criterion and allow us to make an important conceptual distinction between his results and Breirnan's. Suppose a gambler bets the fixed fraction 'Y of his capital at each toss of the p-coin. Kelly considers the exponential growth rate G = lim log[(F,JF 0 ) 11 n].
If our gambler has W wins and L losses in the first n trials, Fn = (1 + -y)w (1 --y)LF 0 , so G =lim (:log (1 +-y)+~log (1--y)) = p log (1 +-y)+q log (1--y), by the law of large numbers. The growth rate G is maximized by 'Y = p -q, and if he uses another 'Y his G will be less and therefore eventually so will his fortune. A complication enters when we consider, as Kelly did not, strategies which are not fixed-fraction strategies. In that case we can have different strategies with the same G, e.g., use y = 1 for the first 1000 trials and then use y = p -q. This complication is intrinsic in the use of G and it has consequences which are quite serious for any application. For example, two strategies which at trial n give fortunes, respectively, of 1 and exp (.Jn), both have G = 1! It is obviously unsatisfactory to regard these two strategies with the same G as 'the same', but it is done because using G makes it easy to extend the Kelly results to more general situations which involve more general random variables; using G the argument is a simple one employing either the law of large numbers or techniques which 'rely heavily on those used to generalize the law of large numbers' ([15), p. 218). Breiman understood the problems created by using G and so he considered Fnf F!, not (FJF~) 11 ". This is mathematically more difficult, but the results are more useful.
Definitions and lemmas
We shall consider situations with the property that at each time period a gambler can lose no more than the amount he invests, e.g., buying stock or betting on Las Vegas table games. Since there is a real limit to a gambler's liability, based on his total fortune, a broad interpretation of the phrase 'the amount he invests' will allow the inclusion of such situations as selling stock short or entering commodity futures contracts.
We suppose that there are a finite number of situations 1, 2, · · ·,Non which a gambler can bet various fractions of his (infinitely divisible) capital. The random variables Xh X 2 , • • · , XN represent, respectively, the outcome of a unit bet on situations 1, 2, · · · , N. Because the loss can be no more than the investment, Xk ;?; -1 for 1 ~ k ~ N. (Breiman considers the amount returned to the gambler after he has given up his bet in order to play, a real example of this sequence of events being betting on the horses. Here the amount the gambler gets back is ;?;0, which corresponds to the amount he wins being ;?; -1). We further suppose, with no loss of applicability, that in all of what follows each Xk has an expectation, i.e., that E(IX1c D is finite. These will be the only restrictions on the random variables, and so we are considering a substantially larger class than those discrete random variables Breiman considers.
We also suppose that the gambler can repeatedly reinvest and change the proportion of the capital bet on the situations. The outcome at time j corresponds to the random variables J0/l, x<p, · · · , Xk/. For each k, 1 ~ k ~ N, the results of repeated betting of one unit on the kth situation is a sequence _xtl), _xt 2 >, · · ·, x~m>, · · · of independent random variables, each having the same distribution as Xk. In contrast to this independence, it is quite important for applications that X 1 , X 2 , • · • , XN be allowed to be dependent. way his -y's always sum to 1. We shall not do this.) Letting Fm be the fortune which is the result of m bets using ,.co, -y< 2 >, · · ·, -y<m>, and F 0 be the initial fortune,
To simplify the notation, let xm = (Xy>, · · · , XW) and denote the scalar product with ,,(j) = < ,.y>, ,.~>, . · . , -y%>) by ,,(j) · xm, obtaining 
Proof.
(i) The function f(x) =log (1 + x) is strictly concave on (-1, oo), and so for x =(xt> · · ·, xN) a value of X, a and /3 in D, and O<a<l,
an inequality which also holds if either a · x or (3 · x is -1. Integrating (5) with respect to the probability measure P of the space on which X is defined,
(ii) Since <f> is concave the set where it attains its max is convex. H <f>(a) = <f>( (3) is a max, then for 0 <a< 1,
From (5) and (6),
Because f is strictly concave, aa
at all values of X where f is finite. Both sides of (7) are -oo only at values of X where
Ay; Here is a simple example which conceptually illustrates a practical use of the Kelly-Breiman criterion: maximize E(log Fm).
Example 1. Define two random variables X 1 and X 2 by flipping a fair coin: if heads, then X 1 =100 and X 2 = -10, if tails, then X 1 = -1 and X 2 = 1. The payoff from X 1 is far superior to the payoff from X 2 , but because X 1 and X 2 are (completely) correlated and have payoffs with opposite signs, the criterion will mix both in order to smooth out the rate of capital growth. A simple calculation shows that <f>( 'Y) = E(log (1 + ,, 1 x 1 + ')' 2 X 2 )) is maximized over D on the face ' Yi+ ')' 2 = 1 at 'Yf = 0.54 and 'Y~ = 0.46. (Lemma 3 will discuss the basic problem created by maxima occurring at non-interior points of D.) The extent to which the criterion will sacrifice expectation is surprising: E(0.54X 1 + 0.46X 2 )=24.7vs. E(X 1 )=49.5.
A fascinating example of the use of this criterion, in which the underlying idea is the same as this example, is in hedging a warrant against its stock as described in [15] , pp. 220-222.
Example 2. For ,\ > 0, let X have density ,\e-Mx + t > for x E;;-1, and 0 for x < -1; an exponential shifted to allow losses. We shall show that there is a unique ,,*,O~'Y*<l, which maximizes <f>('Y)=E(log(l+,,X)), o~,,~1; ,,* = 0 iff ,\ E;; l.
By Lemma 1, For future reference we note that it is not obvious that <f> is continuous at 1; part of the computation involves an integration by parts and a change of variable to obtain <f>('Y) = log(l -,,)+eaEl(a), a as above. The expansion El(a) = e-a(-log a -'Yo+ o(a)) ([l], p. 229), where 'Yo= 0.577 · · · is Euler's constant, shows that lirn.,
In Example 2 -y* = 0 iff E(X) ~ 0, i.e., a gambler bets on X only if it has positive expectation. This is a special case of a more general result. Breiman [4] , p. 65, calls a game favorable if there is a strategy such that the associated fortune F" tends almost surely to oo with n, and he shows that this condition is equivalent to <f>(-y*) being positive ( [4] , Proposition 3, p. 68). Lemma 2 establishes the equivalence with the intuitive Condition (iv).
Optimal strategies for repeated games Lemma 2. The following are equivalent: (i) There is a strategy with the associated fortune
Fn -oo a.s. as n -oo.
(iv) E(X.) > 0 for at least one i, 1 ;a i ;a N.
Proof.
(i) implies (ii).
In Theorem 1 we show that Fn/F! tends almost surely to a finite limit.
(ii) implies (iii). If <f>( -y*) = 0, then F~ = F 0 for all n. If ( -y 1 , -y 2 ) is a point where <f> attains its max, then so is ( -y 2 , -y,) by symmetry.
Since <f> is concave, (!)(<f>( 'Yt> -y 2 ) + <f>( 'Y2, -y 1 )) ;a <PG( 'Y1 + 'Y2)J( 'Y1 + 'Y2)), and we may look for the maximum of <f> along the diagonal (-y, -y), O;a-y;a!. Then
The second derivative is <O, and <f>' is decreasing. A direct but tedious integration and calculation shows that
Hence <f> ( -y, -y ), which can be shown to be continuous on [O, tJ, increases up to its max at @, !) as long as b ~log (16) The surprising fact is that for one variable X 1 a gambler does not bet all his fortune no matter what b is, but he does bet all his fortune on two independent copies of X 1 for b large enough.
The reader who has carried out the calculations of Examples 2 and 3 knows that, because of the possible singularity on I 1' 1c = 1, it is not clear that <f> attains a maximum, and the differentiability of 4> on the boundary L 1'1c = 1 is even less clear.
Think of a continuous strictly increasing concave function f on [O, 1] and redefine it at 1 so that its value there is less than f (0). If this redefined function
were E(log (1 +yX)), then X would be a most interesting game with no Kelly-Breiman optimal strategy: with unit fortune, if a gambler bet an amount less than 1 he could always do better by betting slightly more, but betting all would be worst.
One result of Lemma 3 is that there is an optimal y* so no game can have the property discussed in the paragraph above. Another result of Lemma 3 is that <f> is continuous, when finite. This is important because when we compute y*, a numerical calculation which will generally give y* to a certain number of decimals, we want to know that using this approximation to the exact y* will give close to optimal performance.
The other result is a substitute for differentiation when y* has I,,:= 1, which allows us to derive the basic inequalities (9) and (10) . Note that if all the random variables Xh X 2 , • · · , XN are discrete, with a finite number of values, as they are in [ 4] , then we can differentiate 4> at y*: for then if y* · X equals -1 it does so with positive probability and 4>( y*) = -oo< 4>(0) = 0, contrary to <f>(y*) a maximum; thus <f> is actually defined on a neighborhood of y* (which may extend outside D ) and is differentiable as in Lemma 1. The problems which Lemma 3 resolves are those which arise from more general random variables. 
Since e was arbitrary, this holds on (0, 1].
If I -yt < 1, then Lemma 1 establishes the fact that the expectations in (10) are 0. As in Lemma 2, if m is not in K, then fixing all the variables in <f> but 'Ym and considering that concave function with a max at 0 shows that iJ<f>/iJ-ym ( 'Y*) ~ 0 and (9) follows. Now suppose that L 'Yt = 1 and let x = (x1> · · ·, xN) be some value of the random variable X in which not all the xk = -1 for k in K. Note that the event xk = -1 for all k in K has probability 0 since the integrand in the integral defining <f> is -oo there and </>( 'Y*) is finite.
The function f is finite because x was so chosen, and is differentiable with 
l+'Y* . x
For 0 < e < 1 and k in K, the choice 'Yi = 'Yf for ii= k and 'Yk = -yt(l -e) in (11) gives -S Xk/(1 + -y* · X) dP ~ 0, and S Xk/(1 + 'Y* · X) dP is non-negative and therefore finite.
For k in K and any m, and 0 < e < -Yt, the choice ' Yi = -yj for j neither k nor m, y,, = y! -e, T'm = y!, + e in (11) gives (9) . Finally, (10) follows from (9) by symmetry.
Theorems
If F,, is a gambler's fortune at the nth time period, obtained by using some strategy ,, 0 >, y(2), · · · , y<">, · · · , and F! is the fortune obtained by using the fixed fraction strategy y*, y*, · · · , y*, · · · , then Breiman concludes ( [ 4] , Theorem 2, p. 72) that Jim F.JF! almost surely exists and E(lim F.JF!)~ 1. We extend these results in Theorem 1 below. Two comments are in order.
First, the advantage in using y*, as indicated by the fact that E(lim F,,/ F!) ~ 1, does not require passage to the limit. This was noted by Durham, for the case of two branching processes, in the proof of Theorem 1 of (6] Proof. Let m be given and let ~m be the sigma-algebra generated by X~>, l~k~N, l~j~m. Then Since x<m+i> has the same distribution as X, this can be written (12) ; ; [ E(l +yl*. x)+ k~1 ' Ykm+oE(l +~:. all, and if y* bets all so does he, then E(Fn/F!) = l. So with the same intuitive interpretation as above, 'on the average' the gambler does the same with F" as with F!, so it really does not matter which strategy he uses! But we know that it does matter. For example, in a repeated biased-coin toss, if he plays a fixed fraction strategy betting an amount y-:f y* = p -q, then almost surely F ,J F! ___.
0. Yet we have E(F"JF!) = 1. In general it will not help to look at lim Fn/F!.
For example, if on the first flip of the coin he bets all his fortune, and from then on he bets p -q, F ,J F! > 1 with probability p. does not come from a strategy equivalent to using y* repeatedly. The suspicious reader will note that this characterization of the sense in which y* is optimal contains an expectation. Anyone attempting to state intuitively the result of Theorem 2(i) in the form ' F! is better than Fn because, on the average, F!/Fn ~ 1', should also be willing to apply the same interpretation to 
B ~exp (E(log (1 + y* · x<m +o)) -E(log (1 + y < m+O(w) · x < m+l)))) = C, say.
By Lemma 1, C>l unless y* · X=ym + 1 (w)·X almost surely, in which case C= 1. Thus (15) with equality holding iff y* · X = 'Y~:>+ l) · X almost surely for almost all values w in the range of (X 0 >, · · · , x < "'>). If E(F!,+ 1 /Fm+i) = l , then 1 = E(E(F! + 1 /Fm+l I 1:€m)) ~ E(F!!Fm) ~ · · · ~E(Fo/Fo) = 1. By (15) , equality holds in (15) and therefore y* · X = y<m+l)(w) · X for almost all w in the range of (Xm, · · · , x <m>). Continue for m, m -1, · · · , 1, to obtain (ii).
